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Advancements in information technologies promise to make our lives
transparent.1 Corporations large and small engage in data mining activities
that capture massive amounts of information. Much of this mined
information is about our daily activities—what was purchased, where,
and for how much. Our mailboxes and e-mail accounts are then stuffed
with an endless stream of advertisements and solicitations. Even more
alarming are telemarketers who intrude upon our solitude at home.
Financial information, phone numbers, and personal addresses of all
sorts, whether accurate or not, are captured in databases and bought and
sold to individuals, corporations, and government agencies. Beyond data
mining, video surveillance, facial recognition technology, and spyware, a
host of other invasive tools are opening up private lives for public
consumption.2
Advocates of informational privacy are opposed to a system that
promotes the free flow of personal information, driven more or less by
economic considerations and national security interests. Many privacy
supporters have welcomed the European Union’s statutory regulations
regarding personal data storage and transfer. And while the United
States protects informational privacy, it is arguably the case that these
protections are fairly weak3—or at least not as strong as the European
Privacy Directive.4
In this paper I will offer several arguments in support of the view that
individuals have moral claims to control personal information. Coupled
with rights to control access to one’s body, capacities, and powers, or
physical privacy rights, we will have taken important steps toward a
general right to privacy. In Part I, a definition of privacy is offered
1. See generally DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY (1998) (discussing how
technology diminishes privacy).
2. According to one estimate there are more than four million surveillance
cameras in Britain. JEFFERY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD 36 (2004), citing Michael
McCahill & Clive Norris, CCTV in London 20 (Urbaneye Working Paper No. 6, 2002),
http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue_wp6.pdf.
3. See JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE
RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 148–51 (1997); Randal Kemp & Adam D. Moore, Privacy, 25
LIBR. HI TECH 58, 67–72 (2007).
4. Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, available at http://ec.europa.
eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf and http://ec.europoa.eu/
justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part2_en.pdf.
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along with an account of the value of privacy. Simply put, privacy—
defined as control over access to locations and information—is necessary
for human well-being. In Part II, an attempt to move beyond claims of
value to claims of obligation is presented and defended. Policies that
sanction the capturing, storing, and trading of personal information
about others is something we each have reasons to avoid. In the final
part, the tension between privacy and security is considered. It is argued
that privacy rights may be set aside only if specific procedural conditions
are followed.
I. PRIVACY: ITS MEANING AND VALUE5
A. The Meaning of Privacy
Privacy has been defined in many ways over the last century.6 Samuel
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, following Judge Thomas Cooley,
called privacy “the right to be let alone.”7 Roscoe Pound and Paul A.
Freund have defined privacy in terms of an extension of one’s personality
or personhood.8 Legal scholar William Prosser separated privacy cases
into four related torts: intrusion, private facts, false light, and
appropriation.9 These torts have been defined as follows:
Intrusion: Intruding (physically or otherwise) upon the solitude of another in a
highly offensive manner. . . . Private facts: Publicizing highly offensive private
information about someone which is not of legitimate concern to the public. . . .
False light: Publicizing a highly offensive and false impression of another. . . .
Appropriation: Using another’s name or likeness for some advantage without
the other’s consent.10

5. Some of this part draws from Adam D. Moore, Privacy: Its Meaning and
Value, 40 AM. PHIL. Q. 215, 215–23 (2003).
6. See DECEW, supra note 3, chs. 1–4 (providing rigorous analysis of the major
accounts of privacy that have been offered); Kemp & Moore, supra note 3, at 62–66.
See generally Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006)
(attempting to delineate privacy’s bounds by discussing a “taxonomy” of activities that
harm privacy).
7. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888);
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195
(1890).
8. See Paul A. Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY
182, 182–84 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971); Roscoe Pound,
Interests in Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 362–64 (1915).
9. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
10. ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 155–56
(1995).
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Alan Westin and others, including myself, have described privacy in
terms of information control.11 Still others have insisted that privacy
consists in the form of autonomy over personal matters.12 William Parent
argued, “Privacy is the condition of not having undocumented personal
knowledge about one possessed by others,”13 while Julie Inness defined
privacy as “the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions,
which includes decisions about intimate access, intimate information,
and intimate actions.”14 More recently, Judith Wagner DeCew has proposed
the “realm of the private to be whatever is not, according to a reasonable
person in normal circumstances, the legitimate concern of others.”15 This
brief summary indicates the variety and breadth of the definitions that have
been offered.16
I favor what has been called a control-based definition of privacy.
That is, privacy has to do with control over access to oneself and to
information about oneself.17 One feature of such a conception is that it
can incorporate much of the aforementioned definitions. Controlling

11. ADAM D. MOORE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION CONTROL 181–
82 (2001); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); see also ANITA L. ALLEN,
WHY PRIVACY ISN’T EVERYTHING: FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
115–16 (2003). See generally Ruth Gavison, Information Control: Availability and
Exclusion, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 113 (S.I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983)
(discussing the distinction between public and private information, conflicts over
information controls, and possible resolutions for information-control conflicts).
12. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see also H. Tristram
Engelhardt, Jr., Privacy and Limited Democracy: The Moral Centrality of Persons, SOC.
PHIL. & POL’Y, Summer 2000, at 120, 123–24; Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty,
and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 446
(1983); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1410–11
(1974); Daniel R. Ortiz, Privacy, Autonomy, and Consent, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
91, 91–92 (1989).
13. W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 269, 269
(1983).
14. JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 140 (1992).
15. DECEW, supra note 3, at 62.
16. Samuel Rickless offers a barrier theory of privacy: “For X to have a right to
privacy against Y is for X to have a claim against Y that Y not learn or experience some
personal fact about X by breaching a barrier used by X to keep others from learning or
experiencing some personal fact about X.” Samuel C. Rickless, The Right to Privacy
Unveiled, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 773, 787 (2007). One problem with this account is that
it is not at all clear what counts as breaching a barrier. A bad disguise might be a barrier
to those with poor eyesight while walls, fences, and security systems may not be a
barrier to someone with Superman ears.
17. See also ALLEN, supra note 11, at 1–2; CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF
VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE 140–41 (1970); Gavison, supra
note 11, at 113–20, 129–32; Hyman Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in NOMOS XIII:
PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 169, 170; Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27
RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 279–80 (1974); Ernest Van Den Haag, On Privacy, in NOMOS
XIII: PRIVACY, supra, at 149, 149; Richard Wasserstrom, Privacy: Some Arguments and
Assumptions, in PHILOSOPHICAL LAW 148, 148 (Richard Bronaugh ed., 1978).
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access to ourselves affords individuals the space to develop as they see
fit. Such control yields room to grow personally while maintaining
autonomy over the course and direction of one’s life. Moreover, each of
Prosser’s torts contains elements of access control. Also, note that there
is room for the distinction between physical privacy and informational
privacy. The former would afford individuals a right to control access to
their bodies and places, while the latter yields a right to control access to
personal information, no matter how it is instantiated.
A serviceable notion of personal information comes from William
Parent: “My suggestion is that it be understood to consist of facts about a
person which . . . individuals in a given society at a given time do not want
widely known about themselves.”18 More generally, personal information
might be loosely defined as information or facts about specific individuals
rather than inanimate objects, social institutions, and the like.19 For
example, information about a specific individual’s sexual orientation,
medical condition, height, weight, income, home address, phone number,
occupation, and voting history would be considered personal information on
this account.20
In addition to the different conceptions already noted, there are two
distinctions relating to the definition of privacy that have been widely
discussed. The first is the distinction between descriptive and normative
conceptions of privacy. A descriptive or non-normative account describes a
state or condition where privacy obtains. An example is Parent’s definition:
“Privacy is the condition of not having undocumented personal knowledge
about one possessed by others.”21 A normative account, on the other hand,
makes references to moral obligations or claims. For example, when
DeCew talks about what is a “legitimate concern of others,” she includes
ethical considerations.22

18. Parent, supra note 13, at 269–70 (citation omitted).
19. As with privacy, defining the term information is difficult. See, e.g., Michael
K. Buckland, Information as Thing, 42 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. 351 (1991); C.E. Shannon, A
Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 379 (1948); Andrzej
Chmielecki, What is Information?, TWENTIETH WORLD CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY, Aug.
1998, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Cogn/CognChmi.htm.
20. On this view, just because some bit of information is publicly available does
not mean that it is not personal information.
21. Parent, supra note 13, at 269 (emphasis added).
22. DECEW, supra note 3, at 57–58. Many counterexamples to control-based
definitions of privacy illicitly move back and forth between non-normative and normative
conceptions. For example, Rickless, following Parent’s example, describes the Threatened
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Reductionist and nonreductionist accounts of privacy have also been
offered.23 Reductivists argue that privacy is derived from other rights
such as life, liberty, and property rights; there is no overarching concept
of privacy but, rather, several distinct core notions that have been lumped
together. Viewing privacy in this fashion might mean jettisoning the idea
altogether and focusing on more fundamental concepts. For example,
Frederick Davis has argued:
If truly fundamental interests are accorded the protection they deserve, no need
to champion a right to privacy arises. Invasion of privacy is, in reality, a
complex of more fundamental wrongs. Similarly, the individual’s interest in
privacy itself, however real, is derivative and a state better vouchsafed by
protecting more immediate rights.24

Unlike Davis, the nonreductionist views privacy as related to, but distinct
from, other rights or concepts.
These distinctions are not as important as some may have thought.
First, it is possible and proper to define privacy along normative and
descriptive dimensions. Intellectual property is also defined descriptively and
normatively. We may, for example, define intellectual property without
making any essential references to normative claims. We can even give
a description of the conditions that surround an intellectual property
right. Moreover, we can define intellectual property in normative terms by
indicating the moral claims that surround persons and their property.
The same is true of privacy.
Second, without considering the justification of the rights involved, it
is unclear if privacy is reducible to more basic rights or the other way
around. Parent and others have made this point.25 And even if the
reductionist is correct, it does not follow that we should do away with
the category of privacy rights. The cluster of rights that comprise privacy
may find their roots in property or liberty, yet still mark out a distinct
kind. Finally, if all rights are nothing more than complex sets of obligations,
powers, duties, and immunities, it would not automatically follow that
we should dispense with talk of rights and frame our moral discourse in
these more basic terms.
Loss Counterexample, which has no force if we are considering a right to control access.
See Rickless, supra note 16, at 782–84.
23. For an analysis of the reductive versus nonreductive debate, see generally Amy
Peikoff, No Corn on this Cobb: Why Reductionists Should Be All Ears for Pavesich, 42
BRANDEIS L.J. 751 (2004). See also Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 304–05 n.4 (1975). For a critique of Thomson’s view of privacy,
see Thomas Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315 (1975).
24. Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean by “Right to Privacy”?, 4 S.D. L. REV. 1,
20 (1959).
25. See DECEW, supra note 3, at 29 (citing Jeffrey Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and
Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26–44 (1976); Scanlon, supra note 23, at 315–22.
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B. The Value of Privacy
While privacy rights may entail obligations and claims against others,
obligations and claims that are beyond the capacities of most nonhuman
animals, a case can still be offered in support of the claim that separation
is valuable for animals. Even though privacy may be linked to free will,
the need for separation provides an evolutionary first step. Perhaps it is
the capacity of freewill that changes mere separation into privacy. Alan
Westin notes in Privacy and Freedom:
One basic finding of animal studies is that virtually all animals seek periods of
individual seclusion or small-group intimacy. This is usually described as the
tendency toward territoriality, in which an organism lays private claim to an
area of land, water, or air and defends it against intrusion by members of its
own species.26

More important are the ecological studies demonstrating that a lack of
private space, due to overpopulation and the like, will threaten survival.
In such conditions, animals may kill each other or engage in suicidal
reductions of the population. Lemmings may march into the sea or there
may be what is called a “biochemical die-off.” John J. Christian’s study
of a herd of Sika deer illustrates the point: “Mortality evidently resulted
from shock following severe metabolic disturbances, probably as a result
of prolonged adrenocortical hyperactivity, judging from histological
material. There was no evidence of infection, starvation, or other obvious
cause to explain the mass mortality.”27 In this case the inability to separate
from other members of the same species apparently caused a die-off so
that herd numbers could accommodate separation.28
John Calhoun notes that experiments with rats and spacing in cages
show that a certain level of separation is necessary for the species.29 The
lack of separation leads to the disruption of social relationships and
increases in disease, high blood pressure, and heart failure. Calhoun allowed
Norway rats, which were amply fed, to breed freely in a quarter-acre
pen. Their numbers stabilized at 150 and never exceeded 200.30 With a
26. WESTIN, supra note 11, at 8.
27. John J. Christian, Phenomena Associated with Population Density, 47 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 428, 444 (1961).
28. Id. at 443–46.
29. Edward T. Hall, Proxemics, 9 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 83, 87 (1968) (citing
John B. Calhoun, The Study of Wild Animals Under Controlled Conditions, 51 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1113–15 (1950)).
30. Id.
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population of 150, fighting became so disruptive to normal maternal care
that only a few of the young survived. If placed in pens, the same area
could support 5,000 rats.31 Moreover these results hold across a wide
range of species, supporting the contention that separation, like food and
water, is a necessity of life.32
If it is plausible to maintain that humans evolved from nonhuman
animals, then it is also plausible that humans may retain many of the
same traits. The question now becomes, is separation a necessity for
well-being, and is it found in human cultures? If so, like other basic
requirements for living, we may plausibly conclude that privacy is
valuable.
Cultural universals have been found in every society that has been
systematically studied.33 Based on the Human Relations Area Files at
Yale University, Alan F. Westin argues that there are aspects of privacy
found in every society—privacy is a cultural universal.34
Barry Schwartz, in an important article dealing with the social
psychology of privacy, provides interesting clues as to why privacy is
universal.35 According to Schwartz, privacy is both group preservation
31. WESTIN, supra note 11, at 10; see also W.C. ALLEE, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF
ANIMALS 91 (1938) (finding that overcrowding reduces growth in animal species);
ROBERT ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE 55–56 (1966) (discussing animal
territoriality and its effect on reproductive success); John B. Calhoun, A Behavorial Sink,
in ROOTS OF BEHAVIOR 295, 314–15 (Eugene L. Bliss ed., 1962) (discussing rat
overcrowding experiment that led to atypical behavior and reproductive failure); John B.
Calhoun, Population Density and Social Pathology, 206 SCI. AM. 139, 139 (1962)
(same); EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION 23 (Anchor Books 1982) (1966); H.
ELLIOT HOWARD, TERRITORY IN BIRD LIFE 273–75 (reprint 1978) (1920) (describing
territoriality among bird species).
32. See, e.g., ALLEE, supra note 31, at 91; V.C. WYNNE-EDWARDS, ANIMAL
DISPERSION IN RELATION TO SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 188–89 (1962); Edward S. Deevey, The
Hare and the Haruspex: A Cautionary Tale, 49 YALE REV. 161, 178 (1959), reprinted in
48 AM. SCI. 415 (1960); E. Thomas Gilliard, On the Breeding Behavior of the Cock-ofthe-Rock (Aves, Rupicola rupicola), 124 BULL. AM. MUSEUM NAT’L HIST. 31, 61–63
(1963); Robert L. Snyder, Evolution and Integration of Mechanisms that Regulate
Population Growth, 47 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 449, 454 (1961).
33. See George P. Murdock, Universals of Culture, in READINGS IN ANTHROPOLOGY 4
(E. Adamson Hoebel et al. eds., 1955).
34. WESTIN, supra note 11, at 12–13. John Roberts and Thomas Gregor support
this view of privacy:
[P]rivacy as a set of rules against intrusion and surveillance focused on the
household occupied by a nuclear family is a conception which is not to be
found universally in all societies. Societies stemming from quite different
cultural traditions such as the Mehinacu and the Zuni do not lack rules and
barriers restricting the flow of information within the community, but the
management and the functions of privacy may be quite different.
John M. Roberts & Thomas Gregor, Privacy: A Cultural View, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY,
supra note 8, at 199, 225 (emphasis added).
35. Barry Schwartz, The Social Psychology of Privacy, 73 AM. J. SOC. 741, 741–
52 (1968).
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and maintenance of status divisions, but it also allows for deviation while
sustaining social establishments.36 As such, privacy may be woven into the
fabric of human evolution.
While privacy may be a cultural universal necessary for the proper
functioning of human beings, its form—the actual rules of association
and disengagement—is culturally dependent.37 The kinds of privacy rules
found in different cultures will be dependent on a host of variables including
climate, religion, technological advancement, and political arrangements.
As with the necessities of food, shelter, and education, we should not
jump to the conclusion that because the forms of privacy are culturally
dependent, privacy is subjective “all the way down.” The forms of privacy
are culturally relational while the need is an objective necessity.
In 1969, Edward Hall noted a link between a lack of privacy and
psychological and physical disorders in humans and nonhuman animals.
The disorders of Calhoun’s overcrowded rats bear a striking resemblance to . . .
Americans who live in densely packed urban conditions. . . . Chombart de
Lauwe . . . has gathered data on French workers’ families and has demonstrated
a statistical relationship between crowded living conditions and physical and
social pathology. In the United States a health survey of Manhattan showed that
only 18% of a representative sample were free of emotional disorders while
23% were seriously disturbed or incapacitated.38

Lewis Mumford notes similarities between rat overcrowding and human
overcrowding:
No small part of this ugly urban barbarization has been due to sheer physical
congestion: a diagnosis now partly confirmed by scientific experiments
with rats—for when they are placed in equally congested quarters, they exhibit
the same symptoms of stress, alienation, hostility, sexual perversion, parental
incompetence, and rabid violence that we now find in Megapolis.39

36.
37.

Id.
See Herbert J. Spiro, Privacy in Comparative Perspective, in NOMOS XIII:
PRIVACY, supra note 8, at 121, 122–23.
38. Hall, supra note 29, at 87 (citation omitted).
39. Theodore D. Fuller et al., Chronic Stress and Psychological Well-Being:
Evidence from Thailand on Household Crowding, 42 SOC. SCI. & MED. 265, 267 (1996)
(citation omitted). This view is echoed by Desmond Morris, who writes, “Each kind of
animal has evolved to exist in a certain amount of living space. In both the animal zoo
and the human zoo [when] this space is severely curtailed . . . the consequences can be
serious.” DESMOND MORRIS, THE HUMAN ZOO 39 (1969).
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These results are supported by a number of more recent studies.40
Overcrowding in prisons has been linked to violence,41 depression,42
suicide,43 psychological disorders,44 and recidivism.45
Given all of this, one can, with great confidence, claim that privacy is
valuable for beings like us. The ability to regulate access to our bodies,
capacities, and powers, as well as sensitive personal information, is an
essential part of human flourishing and well-being.
II. TOWARD INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY RIGHTS
While it might be admitted that privacy, broadly defined as a right to
control access to bodies and information, is morally valuable, it has not
been established that individuals have moral claims to control personal
information. One way to begin is by asking how claims to control
intangible objects, like facts about someone, are generated. In the
argument that follows, I will employ a version of John Locke’s proviso
on acquisition: “For this labor being the unquestionable property of the
laborer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at
least where there is enough and as good left . . . for others.”46 Locke
claims that so long as the proviso that enough and as good is satisfied, an
acquisition does not prejudice anyone. Viewed as a kind of “no harm,
no foul” rule, actions that pass this standard leave little room for rational
40. See Andrew Baum & Stuart Koman, Differential Response to Anticipated
Crowding: Psychological Effects of Social and Spatial Density, 34 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 535 (1976); David P. Farrington & Christopher P. Nuttall, Prison
Size, Overcrowding, Prison Violence, and Recidivism, 8 J. CRIM. JUST. 221, 230 (1980);
Fuller et al., supra note 39, at 277; Paul B. Paulus, Garvin McCain & Verne C. Cox,
Death Rates, Psychiatric Commitments, Blood Pressure, and Perceived Crowding as a
Function of Institutional Crowding, 3 ENVTL. PSYCHOL. & NONVERBAL BEHAV. 107, 114
(1978); R. Barry Ruback & Timothy S. Carr, Crowding in a Woman’s Prison: Attitudinal and
Behavioral Effects, 14 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 57, 66 (1984); see also Jes ClausonKaas et al., Urban Health: Human Settlement Indicators of Crowding, 18 THIRD WORLD
PLAN. REV. 349, 353 (1996); Griscom Morgan, Mental and Social Health and Population
Density, 20 J. HUM. REL. 196, 198 (1972). But see John N. Edwards & Alan Booth,
Crowding and Human Sexual Behavior, 55 SOC. FORCES 791, 805 (1977) (finding that
human sexual behavior is not appreciably influenced by crowded conditions).
41. Edwin I. Megargee, The Association of Population Density, Reduced Space,
and Uncomfortable Temperatures with Misconduct in a Prison Community, 5 AM. J.
COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 289, 294 (1977); Frank J. Porporino & Kimberly Dudley, An
Analysis of the Effects of Overcrowding in Canadian Penitentiaries 8–16 (Solicitor Gen.
of Can., User Rep. No. 1984-06, 1984).
42. See sources cited supra note 40.
43. GARVIN MCCAIN, VERNE C. COX & PAUL B. PAULUS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE
EFFECT OF PRISON CROWDING ON INMATE BEHAVIOR 113–15 (1980).
44. Paulus, McCain & Cox, supra note 40, at 112.
45. Farrington & Nuttall, supra note 40, at 229.
46. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (Thomas Peardon ed.,
Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1952) (1690) (emphasis added).
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complaint—I will call this version of Locke’s proviso a “Pareto-based
proviso.”47 Consider the following argument.
P1. The value of privacy related to human well-being grounds a
weak presumptive claim to use and control personal information.
P2. Respect for persons, possessions, self-creation, and project
pursuit grounds a weak presumptive claim to use and control
personal information.
P3. If no one is worsened by such use, then the weak presumptive
claims generated by the value of privacy and respect for persons
are undefeated—actions that pass a Pareto-based proviso are
permitted (no harm, no foul).
P4. It is typically the case that others are not worsened by some
individual’s use and possession of their own personal
information.
C5. Thus, the weak presumptive claims to use and control such
information are, in many cases, undefeated, and moral claims
(perhaps rights) emerge.
The importance of privacy for human well-being, along with a concession
that the promotion of certain fundamental values is a moral requirement,
may provide adequate support for the first premise. Only a pure deontologist
would deny that good and bad consequences, especially those related to
basic needs, do not generate weak presumptive claims.
Support for the second premise builds on the notion of respect for
persons as moral agents. Without justification, it would be wrong to take
personal information and leave the original possessor without it—as it
would be to wrest an apple from someone who just plucked it from an
unowned tree. Developing one’s capacities and intellectual effort and
engaging in lifelong project pursuit are generally voluntary activities that

47. The “Pareto” condition is named after Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), an Italian
economist and sociologist. The Pareto condition is defined as: One state of the world, S1,
is Pareto-superior to another, S2, if and only if no one is worse off in S1 than in S2, and at
least one person is better off in S1 than in S2. S1 is strongly Pareto-superior to S2 if
everyone is better off in S1 than in S2, and weakly Pareto-superior if at least one person is
better off and no one is worse off. State S1 is Pareto-optimal if no state is Pareto-superior
to S1: it is strongly Pareto-optimal if no state is weakly Pareto-superior to it, and weakly
Pareto-optimal if no state is strongly Pareto-superior to it. Throughout this paper I will
use “Pareto” as a “super-weak” condition, namely to mean that no one is worsened. See
G.A. Cohen, The Pareto Argument for Inequality, 12 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 160, 160–61
n.4 (1995).
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can be unpleasant, exhilarating, and everything in between. That we
voluntarily do these things as sovereign moral agents may be enough to
warrant presumptive noninterference claims against others. In doing these
things, we create the facts of our lives. Acknowledging weak presumptive
claims to use and control personal information about these activities
might be grounded in respect for persons and moral desert. Given that
the first two premises establish the same point—they are redundant—if
either is correct, then the argument goes forward.
A. Bettering, Worsening, and the Baseline Problem
Providing support for the third premise requires a clarification and
defense of a Pareto-based proviso. In terms of clarification, we must
adopt an account of value so that moral bettering and worsening can be
determined. An individual could be worsened in terms of subjective
preference, satisfaction, wealth, happiness, freedoms, opportunities, et
cetera. Which of these count in determining bettering and worsening?
Second, once the terms of being worsened have been resolved, what two
situations are we going to compare to determine if someone has been
worsened? Is the question one of how others are now, after my
appropriation, compared to how they would have been were I absent, or
if I had not appropriated, or some other state? Here we are trying to
answer the question: “Worsened relevant to what?” This is known as the
baseline problem.
In principle, the model of informational privacy being sketched is
consistent with a wide range of value theories.48 So long as the preferred
value theory has the resources to determine bettering and worsening with
reference to the use and control of personal information, then Paretosuperior moves can be made and justified.49 For now, assume an Aristotelian
eudaemonist account of value exhibited by the following theses is
correct.

48. It has been argued that subjective preference satisfaction theories fail to give
an adequate account of bettering and worsening. See Donald C. Hubin & Mark B.
Lambeth, Providing for Rights, 27 DIALOGUE 489, 492 (1988); Adam D. Moore, Values,
Objectivity, and Relationalism, 38 J. VALUE INQUIRY 75, 76–80 (2004).
49. Someone could object and claim that being permitted to use and control personal
information because one satisfies a nonworsening requirement is not a justification. I
may not morally worsen anyone by standing on my head at the bus stop—such actions
are permitted but not justified. First, little would be lost by just dropping talk of
justification in favor of what is permitted. Second, given that such actions, however
silly, do not worsen and are within my rights, I would argue that they are justified—
morality requires nothing more of me. See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 33 (Thomas K. Abbott trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1st ed.
1949) (1785).
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1.
2.
3.

Human well-being or flourishing is the sole standard of intrinsic
value.
Human persons are rational project pursuers, and well-being or
flourishing is attained through the setting, pursuing, and completion
of life goals and projects.50
The control of physical and intangible objects is valuable. At a
specific time, each individual has a certain set of things she can
freely use and other things she owns, but she also has certain
opportunities to use and appropriate things. This complex set
of opportunities, along with what she can now freely use or has
rights over, constitutes her position materially—this set
constitutes her level of material well-being.51

While it is certainly the case that there is more to bettering and
worsening than an individual’s level of material well-being, including
opportunity costs, I will not pursue this matter further at present. Needless
to say, a full-blown account of value will explicate all the ways in which
individuals can be bettered and worsened with reference to acquisition.
Moreover, as noted before, it is not crucial to the view being presented
to defend some preferred theory of value against all comers. Whatever
value theory is ultimately correct, if it has the ability to determine
bettering and worsening with reference to the use and control of personal
information, then a nonworsening standard can be used to determine
when weak presumptive claims to use and control are undefeated.
Turning to the baseline problem (what two situations do we compare
to determine moral bettering and worsening?), I believe that we should
affirm the following base point. We compare how someone is after an action
to the moment before. Consider a common case dealing with worsening:
the face puncher case. When Crusoe punches Friday in the face we say that
Friday has been worsened compared to the moment before the punch.
We do not compare Friday’s state of pain after the punching to his
condition a month before when, let us suppose, he was in great pain due
50. For similar views see ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. I, X (Martin
Ostwald trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1962) (350 B.C.E.); KANT, supra note 49, at 42–45;
LOREN E. LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY 26–27, 38 (1987);
RALPH BARTON PERRY, GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE 181–82, 201–02 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1950) (1926); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 408–09 (1971); HENRY SIDGWICK,
THE METHODS OF ETHICS 46–49 (Hackett Publ’g Co. 1981) (1907).
51. The argument in support of the value of privacy offered earlier would support
this view. See supra notes 26–45 and accompanying text.
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to falling into a fire. Since an individual’s level of material well-being changes
over time, the baseline of comparison should also change.
As with the baseline which compares how someone is after an action
to a month ago, the following baseline is also questionable. Suppose we
compare how Friday is when he gets to use and control some value V to
his condition where he does not get to use or control V. On this account,
whenever anyone exclusively uses and controls V, they worsen others.
Assuming that water is valuable, Crusoe worsens Friday when Crusoe
takes a drink. Alas, Friday would be better if he got to drink the water in
question even if they are both standing by an endless stream of perfectly
good drinking water. Such baselines are indefensible because they produce
overbroad accounts of moral bettering and worsening.52
A Pareto-based proviso indicates when others may have legitimate
complaints against an established weak presumptive claim of use and
possession. If in possessing and using their own personal information
no one is worsened relative to the appropriate base point, then no one
could have a compelling claim that would override the weak presumptive
claims already in place. Put another way, an objection to appropriation,
which is a unilateral changing of the moral landscape, would focus on
the impact of the appropriation on others. But if this unilateral changing
of the moral landscape makes no one worse off, there is little room for
rational criticism.53
Several other points can be offered in support of a Pareto-based proviso
as well. A “no harm, no foul” principle leaves moral room for individuals
to live their lives as they see fit. While consequences matter, there is no
maximization requirement—no required trade-offs of someone’s lifelong
goals and projects for mere incremental increases in social utility. In this
way, a Pareto-based proviso accords with our considered convictions
regarding respect for persons, and at the same time, accommodates
consequentialist views linking theories of the good and theories of the
right.
The truth of the fourth premise seems fairly obvious in light of my
characterization of a Pareto-based proviso. When an individual uses and
controls his own personal information, it will be the case that others are

52. For more about the difficulties in determining a baseline, see SHELLY KAGAN,
THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 87–89 (1989); Hubin & Lambeth, supra note 48, at 492–93.
53. To adopt a less stringent principle would permit individuals, in bettering
themselves, to worsen others. Such provisos on acquisition are troubling because they
may open the door to predatory activity. To require individuals, in bettering themselves,
to better others is to require them to give others free rides. Both of these standards are
open to rational complaint. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 185–86
(1974) (discussing claims of justice in a hypothetical “Robinson Crusoe” case where ten
stranded individuals have varying degrees of success fending for themselves).
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not necessarily worsened. Consider some health-related fact that Crusoe
comes to know about himself. To consider if Friday has been worsened,
we compare how he is prior to Crusoe’s coming to know the fact in
question to Friday’s situation after Crusoe’s discovery. In either case,
Friday is unaware and is not worsened by Crusoe’s use and control. On
the other hand, suppose that Crusoe knows that he is a violent sleepwalker
and Friday is planning to sleep nearby. In this case, it seems that Friday
has been—or will be—worsened by Crusoe’s nondisclosure.
If the argument so far has been compelling, then it will be conceded
that individuals have moral claims to use and control their own personal
information. But since information is nonrivalrous, it is not clear that
using and controlling personal information about others worsens them.
To simplify matters, imagine a state of nature situation where Fred exists
in isolation. Over the years, Fred may acquire a host of information
about himself—say, for example, that he likes spicy food. In fact each of
Fred’s actions, his life story so to speak, may be captured as information.
Suppose that when Ginger comes along, she is not worsened by Fred’s
possession and use of the aforementioned information. Thus, Fred’s use
and possession claims would be undefeated, and moral claims may emerge.
Nevertheless, Fred’s claims to control such information do not exclude
the possibility of others owning or using such information.
In seeking to use and possess information about Fred, Ginger does not
necessarily worsen Fred. Suppose that upon seeing him, Ginger notes that
Fred has green eyes. Surely Ginger’s mere possession of such information
does not worsen Fred relative to how he would be had Ginger never
come along or had the acquisition not occurred. But when Ginger offers
information about Fred for public consumption—suppose that she shares
this information with a much wider audience than Fred could have ever
reached via daily public activity—she does worsen him in terms of
increased risk, commercial exploitation, and the like.
B. The Risk Argument
Central to the risk argument is the claim that in connected societies
where information trading is both efficient and nearly costless, disclosure of
personal information opens individuals up to certain risks, for example,
being controlled by entities with their own agendas.54 Typically, such
54. Although not my direct concern here, I believe the risk argument could be
modified to apply to small unconnected or nonwired communities as well.
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control comes in two flavors. First, governments use such information
to retain domination and expand power.55 Second, corporations may use
personal information to overwhelm individuals in a sea of solicitations
and promotional advertisements or to control their employees. Sharing
personal information about someone else with a third party—say a home
address and religious affiliation—may have serious consequences. German
Jews in the 1940s, and more recently American Muslims, know this all too
well.
Two further examples should suffice in establishing the plausibility of
this claim. Keeping records of citizens has been, and continues to be, a
way for governments to maintain control over their populations. Nicholas
Kristof writes:
As part of China’s complex system of social control and surveillance, the
authorities keep a . . . file, on virtually everyone except peasants. Indeed, most
Chinese have two [files]: one at their workplace and another in their local police
station.
....
A file is opened on each urban citizen when he or she enters elementary
school, and it shadows the person throughout life, moving on to high school, college
and employer. Particularly for officials, students, professors and Communist
Party members, [these files] contain political evaluations that affect career
prospects and permission to leave the country.56

A different case, but one that is equally alarming, is what happened in
a small village in Greece. In Orchemenos, Greece, there are many
individuals who have a gene that causes sickle-shaped red blood cells.
The problem is that when two parents both carry the gene, their
offspring may develop sickle-cell anemia. In an effort to prevent this
disease, government researchers tested everyone in the village so that
marriages between gene carriers could be avoided. In the end, the carriers
became a shunned subclass forced to marry among themselves, making
55. The following quote from a Chinese military newspaper applies a number of
these issues to information war:
After the Gulf War, when everyone was looking forward to eternal peace, a
new military revolution emerged. This revolution is essentially a transformation
from the mechanized warfare of the industrial age to the information warfare
of the information age. Information warfare is a war of decisions and control,
a war of knowledge, and a war of intellect. The aim of information warfare
will be gradually changed from ‘preserving oneself and wiping out the enemy’
to ‘preserving oneself and controlling the opponent.’ Information warfare includes
electronic warfare, tactical deception, strategic deterrence, propaganda warfare,
psychological warfare, network warfare, and structural sabotage.
John Carlin, A Farewell to Arms, WIRED, May 1997, at 51, 54 (quoting Jiefangjun Bao,
Chinese Army newspaper).
56. Nicholas D. Kristof, Beijing Journal: Where Each Worker is Yoked to a
Personal File, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1992, at A4; see also ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB,
WHO OWNS INFORMATION? 16 (1994).
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the situation even worse than before.57 While the researcher’s goals were
noble, they obviously failed to foresee the ramifications of disclosing
this kind of personal information.
In the typical case, without video, audio, and other kinds of robust
surveillance, when Fred steps out on a public street he both creates certain
facts about himself and relinquishes exclusive control of this information
to those who share the public domain. The information captured by others
is held in nonpermanent mediums like memory and is acquired by a
relatively small number of people. In such cases, Fred incurs few risks,
and the sharing of such information by second and third parties poses
little threat. Please note that Fred could disguise himself or go out at
night to further limit public access to personal information. Hinting at
the property rights argument to come, Fred could use his property to
justifiably limit access to personal information.
But when such information is captured digitally via video and audio
surveillance or with some other more permanent medium, Fred is subjected
to increased risks. Such information may go unused for decades and
then be resurrected by those in power or with commercial agendas. In
societies where personal information trading or data mining is facilitated
through the use of technology, like digital environments, the use and
control of personal information opens individuals up to risks and losses.
If so, the disclosure of such information will worsen Fred relative to
the base point, and a step toward informational privacy will have been
established.
A serious objection to the risk argument is that maybe the risks
imposed on individuals through the manipulation of personal information
are counterbalanced by other values, such as increased opportunities or
security. Data mining companies that gather information about Ginger’s
purchasing habits may be able to more narrowly pitch products and
services. If Ginger likes cowboy boots, data mining companies could
provide her with information about the most up-to-date styles.
Alternatively, Ginger’s government could provide enhanced security for
her and others by using data mining techniques to search for criminal
behavior.
As an admittedly imperfect analogy, consider the risks foisted on
someone else when they are included in a game of Russian roulette without
consenting. The typical game consists of a gun with six chambers, one
57.

Charles Platt, Evolution Revolution, WIRED, Jan. 1997, at 158, 200.
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bullet, and somebody’s head. After loading the bullet and spinning the
chamber, the gun is pointed at someone and the trigger is pulled. Surely
the risks involved in such a game worsen the victim relative to the
appropriate base point. Nevertheless, one could argue that having
digitally stored personal information available for others to exploit is
not like playing a game where the gun has only six chambers—it is
more like a game where the gun has a thousand chambers and some of
the chambers yield benefits, not burdens. True enough, but we are not
playing a one-round game. Imagine playing an iterated game with
hundreds, if not thousands, of rounds played over a lifetime. Moreover,
as one plays the game, the risks of certain payoffs may increase with the
changing times. And in the typical case, the burdens and benefits will be
imposed, not freely chosen.
Two further considerations suggested by Helen Nissenbaum deserve
mention at this point. Nissenbaum notes that data shifting—using
information gathered for one purpose in some new way—violates what
she calls contextual integrity. “In the public surveillance currently practiced,
information is routinely shifted from one sphere to another, as when, for
example, information about your supermarket purchases is sold to a list
service for magazine subscriptions.”58 An admittedly extreme case of data
shifting occurred when a stalker secured actress Rebecca Schaeffer’s
home address from certain state licensing records and murdered her.59
Moreover, the digitization of information coupled with the expansion of
computer networks has allowed information aggregation of a sort not
seen before. Information that may be freely given in different contexts
for various purposes is collected in digital profiles that are then sold.
Data shifting and aggregation open up individuals to unforeseen and
unconsented-to risks.
These considerations provide a compelling answer to what might be
called the consent argument against informational privacy. On this
view, individuals have no privacy rights because they have—by stepping
into the public domain or by sharing information—agreed that others
may own and control this information. But even if consent, however
thin it may be, is given for the initial disclosure of disparate bits of
information, it does not follow that consent has also been given for data
shifting and aggregation of this information. The notion of consent implied
in this argument against informational privacy may also be challenged.
Appearing in public is a necessity for most of us.
58. Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of
Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 584, 585 (1998).
59. Paul Jacobs, Addresses at DMV Remain Accessible, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19,
1991, at A3.
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This is not to say that privacy should never be overridden for the sake
of increased security or market opportunities, but given the risks and
benefits of such disclosure, the rule, both moral and legal, should be
against allowing such activity.
C. The Bodily Access and Property Rights Argument
Suppose that Fred creates and wears an antidisclosure suit that shields
him in public spaces entirely. All that his fellows know is that someone
is present—they do not know if Fred is old or young, male or female, tall
or short, et cetera. In simply wearing his antidisclosure suit Fred does
nothing wrong—he does not necessarily worsen anyone. In this example,
to discover information about Fred would require violating his property
rights or liberty rights. Alas, the suit and what it shields is his to control.
While odd and probably perverse, if Fred were to reveal nothing about
himself to anyone at any time, it would be perfectly appropriate.60
Another way to put the point is that Fred’s rights to control access to his
body, capacities, and powers—what might be called physical privacy
rights—coupled with property rights will afford him near complete
control over the information that he creates through daily activity.
As noted earlier, the information that Fred chooses to reveal about
himself may be owned by Ginger and others. Part of reaching out and
developing social relationships with others will be the voluntary disclosure
of personal information. But whatever kind of information we are
considering, there is a gathering point that individuals have control over.
For example, in purchasing a new car and filling out the car loan
application, no one would deny we each have the right to demand that
such information not be sold to other companies. I would argue that this
is true for any disclosed personal information, whether it be patient
questionnaire information, video rental records, voting information, or
credit applications. In agreeing with this view, one first has to agree that
individuals have the right to control their own personal information—
that is, binding agreements about controlling information presuppose
that one of the parties has a moral claim to control this information.
This is just another way of affirming the argument offered in support of
individual claims to control personal information.

60.

Assuming of course that Fred is not shielding immoral and criminal activity.
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Aside from controlling information gathering points, there is at least
one other way in which individuals can protect themselves from invasions
of privacy due to digital monitoring.61 J.P. Barlow of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation was the first to suggest this idea. It may be possible
to detach one’s physical self from one’s virtual self through the use of
encryption—the online equivalent of an antimonitoring suit. The idea is
to encrypt all information that links data about you to your name, address, or
social security number—leaving no unencrypted links between your physical
self and your electronic identity. Individuals would then just become a
number identified with data in the form of e-mail letters, purchasing
habits, voting records, credit reports, medical records, and the like.62
To summarize the bodily control and property rights argument in
support of informational privacy, we begin with four plausible propositions.
First, individuals have use and possession claims concerning information
about themselves. Second, individuals have access control rights over
their bodies, capacities, and powers. Third, individuals may acquire
physical and intellectual property that will aid in restricting access to
personal information. And finally, individuals have a general moral and
legal right to make contracts. Taken together, these rights, claims, and
liberties provide the foundation for informational privacy.
One problem for this second argument in support of informational
privacy is that given disparities in holdings and the subsequent ability to
fence oneself off from the outside world, some individuals will have more
privacy than others. The rich will be able to hide behind walls, fences,
lawyers, and butlers, while the not so fortunate will be left exposed to
public consumption. Consider the following case.
[O]n the night of October 30, 1979 . . . an NBC television camera crew entered
the apartment of Dave and Brownie Miller in Los Angeles, without their
consent, to film the activities of Los Angeles Fire Department paramedics called
to the Miller home to administer life-saving techniques to Dave Miller, who had
suffered a heart attack in his bedroom. The NBC television camera crew not
only filmed the paramedics’ attempts to assist Miller, but NBC used the film on
its nightly news without obtaining anyone’s consent. In addition, after it had
received complaints from both Brownie Miller and her daughter, Marlene
Miller Belloni, NBC later used portions of the film in a commercial advertising
an NBC “mini-documentary” about the paramedics’ work.63

61. For numerous other ways to maximize one’s control over personal information, see
DEBORAH G. JOHNSON, COMPUTERS ETHICS 134–35 (3d ed. 2001) (quoting Gary T. Marx,
Privacy & Technology, WHOLE EARTH REV., Winter 1991, at 90, 94).
62. For more about how technology can protect privacy and security, see Ann
Cavoukian, Security Technologies Enabling Privacy (STEPs): Time for a Paradigm Shift
(Off. Info. & Privacy Commissioner Ont., Toronto, Ont.), June 1, 2002, at 7–9, available
at http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/resources/steps.pdf.
63. Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).

828

MOORE POST-AUTHOR PAGES VERS.2 (SUPER FINAL).DOC

[VOL. 44: 809, 2007]

2/7/2008 2:54:33 PM

Toward Informational Privacy Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

One would suspect that if the Millers had employed guards, security
fences, and perhaps “high priced” lawyers, they would have successfully
protected their privacy.
While true, I believe that this sort of objection is fairly anemic.
Individuals will still be able to keep sensitive personal information secret by
manipulating what property they do hold. It is not as if wearing disguises or
paying cash will cease to work. Individuals with little in terms of property
holdings will still be able to restrict information leakage through second
and third parties via contracts and agreements. And finally, if moral
norms are to be reflected in the law, legal privacy guarantees codified in
state and federal statutes will cover everyone.
III. APPLICATIONS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
Having said all of this, I would like to test the model of informational
privacy that has been offered by examining two cases dealing with personal
information control. A canonical example of a privacy violation is all too
familiar in garden-variety peeping Tom cases. A second case, one that
will be examined in some detail, concerns privacy and governmental
surveillance.
A. Peeping Toms and Informational Privacy
Suppose Tom, after sneaking through the bushes and pulling aside a
blind, licentiously watches Ginger who is in her house. Maybe Tom
watches Ginger take a shower or dress for bed. We can all agree that
what Tom is doing is immoral—and illegal—given that Ginger does not
know and has not consented to being watched. But why? The typical
answer is that Tom violated Ginger’s right to privacy.
In a two-person world, it might be difficult to see how Ginger is
worsened by Tom’s peeping. Putting aside property rights violations—
Tom is standing on Ginger’s land and has interfered with Ginger’s
control of the window blind—it would seem that Ginger is not worsened
in any objective sense. Tom’s actions do not open Ginger up to third
party risks of control or manipulation, because there are no third parties.
Moreover, suppose that he is not recording the encounter. Any information
obtained will fade with his memory.
It does no good to say that Tom’s peeping worsens Ginger because she
has a general wish or desire not to be watched. Mere desires and wishes are
not the foundations of value claims; however, they may reflect such
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claims.64 In such a contrived two-person world, we may have to say that
Tom does nothing wrong in watching Ginger. In the real world, however,
Tom’s acquisition of information about Ginger does create risks that are
morally relevant to Ginger’s well-being. Maybe Tom innocently
mentions Ginger’s open window to James the burglar. Moreover, Ginger’s
knowledge of Tom’s act is irrelevant to questions of bettering and
worsening. She might never know of the risks foisted on her by Tom,
yet still be worsened.
As we move upward from the two-person case to institutions, legal
systems, and cultural norms that affect relations across numerous
individuals, and if we keep in mind that privacy is a basic need, then we
will have provided adequate grounds for forbidding Tom’s behavior.
His act by itself may not worsen, but allowing such a practice would.
B. Privacy, Secrecy, and Government Surveillance
In times of national crisis, citizens are often asked to trade liberty and
privacy for security. And why not, it is argued, if we can obtain a fair
amount of security for just a little privacy? Moreover, the surveillance
that enhances security need not be overly intrusive or life-altering. It is
not as if government agents need to physically search each and every
suspect or those linked to a suspect. Advancements in digital technology
have made such surveillance relatively unobtrusive. Video monitoring, global
positioning systems, biometric technologies, along with data surveillance
may provide law enforcement officials monitoring tools without also
unduly burdening those being watched.
Against this view are those who maintain that we should be worried
about trading privacy for security. Criminals and terrorists, it is argued,
are nowhere near as dangerous as governments. There are far too many
examples for us to deny Lord Acton’s dictum, “Power tends to corrupt,
and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”65 If information control yields
power, and total information awareness radically expands that power,
then we have good reason to pause before trading privacy for security.
If the model of informational privacy that has been presented is
correct, then individuals have moral claims to control personal information.
Due to space considerations, I will not provide arguments justifying
physical privacy claims66 or security rights—please assume that individuals
64. For a defense of “objectivity” in relation to value claims and an attack on
“subjective” accounts of moral value, see Moore, supra note 48, at 80–82.
65. Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 3, 1887), in 1 LIFE
AND LETTERS OF MANDELL CREIGHTON 372 (1904).
66. This argument runs parallel to the argument for information privacy already
considered. The primary difference is that use of one’s body, capacities, and powers is
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have rights to control access to their bodies and specific locations, and
that individuals have security rights (perhaps this right is simply a
combination of individual rights to life, property, and self-defense).67
Given that security interests and privacy claims often conflict, what is
needed is a generally agreed upon process for determining an appropriate
balance. In this final part, I will consider the often-used “balancing test”
view. Several cases will be presented which indicate how easily balancing
arguments go awry. We should not blithely trust government officials
with good intentions. I will argue that one way to appropriately balance
privacy and security is (1) to insist upon establishing probable cause for
an intrusion, (2) allow for robust judicial discretion on issuing warrants,
and (3) ensure public oversight of the process and the reasoning involved.

rivalrous—unlike the use of information about others. Using or attempting to use
someone else’s body will, in the vast majority of cases, worsen them relative to the
appropriate base point.
67. At first glance, security is valuable and can be separated into three distinct yet
interconnected domains. At the most basic level, security affords individuals control
over their lives, projects, and property. To be secure at this level is to have sovereignty
over a private domain—it is to be free from unjustified interference from other individuals,
corporations, and governments. At this level, privacy and security come bundled together.
At the second level, security protects groups, businesses, and corporations from
unjustified interference with projects and property. Corporations need to be secure from
industrial espionage, theft, and the like. Without this kind of control, businesses and
corporations could not operate in a free market—not for long anyway. In any case, if we
ask the question, “Why do we care about corporations and free markets?,” we are
quickly led back to security at the individual level. We value security at the level of
groups, businesses, and corporations because these entities are intertwined with security
at the personal level. It is through these groups that many of us pursue lifelong plans and
projects and order our lives as we see fit. Few would maintain that these groups are
valuable independent of their impact on individual lives. Privacy and security come
bundled together at this level as well, although in a different way. Through the use of
walls, guards, and fences, groups are able to secure a private domain that may be
necessary for the continued existence of groups and group activities.
There is also national security to consider. Here we are worried about the continued
existence of a political union. Our institutions and markets need to be protected from
foreign invasion, plagues, and terrorism. But again it seems that we value national
security, not because some specific political union is valuable in itself, but because it is a
necessary part of protecting individual liberty. Armed services, intelligence agencies,
police departments, public health institutions, and legal systems provide security for
groups, businesses, and at the most fundamental level, individuals.
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C. A Brief Overview of Surveillance Law in the United States
Within the United States legal system, there are four ways that law
enforcement agents can engage in surveillance.68 First, there are warrants
authorizing the interception of communications. Second, there are warrants
authorizing the search of physical premises. For example, Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act requires that law enforcement
officials obtain a warrant from a judge to conduct surveillance in criminal
cases.69 To issue the warrant, the judge must find probable cause to believe
that the suspect “is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a
particular offense.”70 Third, there are provisions that allow trap-and-trace
devices and pen traps. For example, trap-and-trace devices allow law
enforcement agents to trace outgoing and incoming telephone numbers.
Finally, there are subpoenas requiring the production of goods such as
telephone logs or e-mail records. Unlike the first two methods of
surveillance, the last two require a lower standard of justification.
Trap-and-trace devices only require a sworn declaration that the
information being sought is relevant to an investigation.71 Court orders
for records require that agents show that the information being sought is
relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.72 Moreover, each of
these requirements applies only to domestic surveillance—monitoring
individuals who are not American citizens is another matter.
Surveillance of American citizens is carried out by several agencies
including city, county, and state police departments and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI). The National Security Administration (NSA) and
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are forbidden by law from monitoring
domestic activities and are responsible for conducting surveillance outside
the United States.73
To clarify the intelligence gathering abilities of the FBI, CIA, and
NSA, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Act of 1978 (FISA).74
Judicial oversight of FISA warrants was given to a newly created court

68. Jacob R. Lilly, National Security at What Price?: A Look into Liberty Concerns in
the Information Age Under the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and a Proposed Constitutional
Test for Future Legislation, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 447, 457 (2003).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (2000); see also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 218.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2000).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2000).
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(C) (2000).
73. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted as amended in
50 U.S.C. § 401 (2000).
74. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783.
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called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).75 To obtain a
FISC order allowing surveillance of a U.S. citizen, the government must
show that the target is a foreign power or is the agent of a foreign power.76
Since the information is not related to a criminal investigation, there is
no requirement of probable cause—that is, government agents do not need
to show that the target is, has, or will commit a crime. If the target is not
a U.S. citizen, then no court order is necessary and only authorization
from the Attorney General is required.77
The USA PATRIOT Act made numerous changes to the surveillance
methods already mentioned. Below is a list of some of the changes. The
PATRIOT Act:
1.
2.
3.

4.

Expands the government’s ability to conduct covert “sneak and
peak” searches. Government agents may take photographs, seize
property, and not notify the target until a later time.78
Allows the inclusion of DNA information into databases of
individuals convicted of “any crime of violence.”79
Increases government surveillance abilities of suspected computer
trespassers—any target suspected of violating the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act may be monitored without a court
order.80
Increases the government’s ability to access records held by
third parties.81 By expanding the use of FISA, targets “whose
records are sought need not be an agent of a foreign power.
United States citizens could be . . . investigated on account of
activities connecting them to an investigation of international

75. FISA essentially allows electronic surveillance and physical searches of
foreigners and U.S. citizens when there is “probable cause to believe that . . .
the target . . . is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.” Still,
standards for obtaining a warrant are much less rigorous than under Title III . . . .
Laurie Thomas Lee, The USA PATRIOT Act and Telecommunications: Privacy Under
Attack, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 371, 374–75 (2003) (citing 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1804(a), 1805(a)(3)(A), 1823(a), 1824(a)(3)(A) (2000)).
76. Id.
77. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2000).
78. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, § 213, 115 Stat. 272, 285–86 [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
79. Id. § 503, 115 Stat. at 364.
80. Id. § 217, 115 Stat. at 290–91.
81. Id. § 215, 115 Stat. at 287.
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terrorism.”82 In addition, FISC judges must issue a warrant if
the application meets the requirements of Section 215.
Beyond the government surveillance powers already noted, the U.S.
Constitution grants the President broad powers in times of crisis and
war—in early 2002 President George W. Bush implemented a secret
program that allowed the NSA to conduct warrantless searches of U.S.
citizens. This program authorized the NSA to search international phone
calls from U.S. citizens, thus sidestepping FISA.83
D. “Just Trust Us”—Trading Civil Rights for Security
A common view is that we should give the benefit of the doubt to
those in power and assume that officials will not violate individual rights
without just cause. Public officials typically seek office to promote the
public good and are generally well meaning and sincere people—we
should trust them to do what is right and fair.
Arguably, there are good reasons to distrust this method of establishing
an appropriate balance between privacy and security. Justice Brandeis,
dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, wrote:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert
to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.84

Noting a few examples should suffice in demonstrating the perils of
letting those in power set the guidelines for surveillance: Abraham
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the border states;85
Japanese-American internment during World War II;86 McCarthy and
the House Un-American Activities Committee;87 Laird v. Tatum,88 allowing
82. Lee, supra note 75, at 379.
83. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
84. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
85. Lilly, supra note 68, at 450–51. Lilly notes that these civil rights violations
were not the first in American history. “The Alien and Sedition Acts, Andrew Jackson’s
unlawful detention of reporter Louis Louailler, and military actions during ‘Dorr’s
Rebellion’ in 1842 all violated personal civil liberties in the name of national security.”
Id. at 450 n.14. “Habeas corpus” is Latin for “that you have the body.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004). See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
86. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–16, 223–24 (1944); Yasui
v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 116–17 (1943); Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F.
Supp. 1445, 1447 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 828 F.2d 591,
592–93 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1409 (N.D. Cal.
1984).
87. Lilly, supra note 68, at 453–54.
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military surveillance of civilian activity;89 and COINTELPRO, the FBI’s
covert action program against American citizens.90 One of the more
humorous examples comes from P.J. O’Rourke.
The [United States Department of Agriculture] has over 106,000 employees . . .
[and] they’re too busy doing things like administering the Federal Wool and
Mohair Program. According to the U.S General Accounting Office report to
Congress on the 1990 farm bill, “The government established a wool and mohair
price-support program in 1954 . . . to encourage domestic wool production in the
interest of national security.” Really, it says that. . . . From 1955 to 1980, $1.1
billion was spent on wool and mohair price supports, with 80 percent of that
money going to a mere six thousand shepherds and (I guess) moherds. This is
$146,400 per Bo Peep.91

A more current example comes from abuses related to the USA
PATRIOT Act and the terrorist attacks of 9/11.92 Here I am thinking of AlHussayen’s detainment for more than a year for “providing expert advice and
assistance” to terrorist organizations.93 Finally, in March 2007, numerous

88. 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (holding that plaintiffs did not have standing to
challenge the Army’s surveillance of civilian political activity).
89. See Laura W. Murphy, Director, ACLU Washington National Office, ACLU
Looks at Domestic Surveillance and the Need to Watch the Watchers in Times of Crisis
(Oct. 10, 2001), http://www.aclu.org/FreeSpeech/FreeSpeech.cfm?ID=9790&c=86.
90. S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 3–4 (1976).
91. P.J. O’ROURKE, PARLIAMENT OF WHORES: A LONE HUMORIST ATTEMPTS TO
EXPLAIN THE ENTIRE U.S. GOVERNMENT 144–45 (1991) (emphasis added).
92. Consider how “terrorism” is now defined:
A person engages in domestic terrorism if they do an act “dangerous to human
life” that is a violation of the criminal laws of a state or the United States, if the
act appears to be intended to: (i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii)
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or
kidnapping.
ACLU, How the USA PATRIOT Act Redefines “Domestic Terrorism” (Dec. 6, 2002),
http://www.aclu.org/natsec/emergpowers/14444leg20021206.html (citing USA PATRIOT
Act, supra note 78, § 802). If establishing (i)–(iii) is a matter of determining intentions,
then the current debate over the legitimacy of torture may be seen in a new light.
Alas, one way to determine the intentional status of a suspect is to torture him.
93. The Department of Justice also used the material support provisions of the
Patriot Act to prosecute Muslim student Sami al-Hussayen for engaging in
First Amendment activities. Section 805 of the Patriot Act made it a crime to
provide material support in the form of “expert advice and assistance” to a
designated foreign terrorist organization. Al-Hussayen, a 34-year old doctoral
candidate at the University of Idaho and a computer expert, was charged with
providing “expert advice and assistance” because, among other things, he
volunteered as a Webmaster for the Islamic Assembly of North America—an
organization the government had not put on its list of foreign terrorist

835

MOORE POST-AUTHOR PAGES VERS.2 (SUPER FINAL).DOC

2/7/2008 2:54:33 PM

news agencies reported that the FBI had overstepped its authority and
tried to cover it up. The audit by the Justice Department also found that
the FBI had hatched an agreement with telephone companies allowing the
agency to ask for information on more than 3,000 phone numbers—often
without a subpoena, without an emergency or even without an investigative case.
In 2006, the FBI then issued blanket letters authorizing many of the requests
retroactively, according to agency officials and congressional aides briefed on
the effort.94

“Just trust us” sentiments might have more force if robust accountability
provisions accompanied them. But FISA courts meet in secret, their findings
are almost never published, and only government officials appear before
the court.95 Bush’s program authorizing the NSA to monitor international
phone calls of U.S. citizens was secret—even more alarming to some,
information about the program was withheld for a year by a “free press.”96
One can only wonder what other secret programs are currently in place.97
organizations. The government charged that this volunteer activity constituted
expert advice and assistance.
Al-Hussayen’s web pages provided many links, including links to “fatwas”
that advocated criminal activity and suicide operations, but that were not
written by al-Hussayen. Essentially, he was reporting what others said—something
journalists do every day. Al-Hussayen’s lawyer also established that Reuven
Paz, a prosecution witness, admitted that he had posted much of the same
information on his own website and that the BBC did as well. The Justice
Department did not stop this abuse of the Patriot Act, and detained alHussayen for one and one-half years on minor immigration charges. It was a
jury that stopped this abuse by finding al-Hussayen not guilty of all terrorism
charges leveled against him. He was later deported on immigration charges.
Anthony D. Romero, ACLU Letter to Senator Feinstein Addressing the Abuses of the
Patriot Act by the Government (Apr. 4, 2005), http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/17
563leg20050404.html (citation omitted).
94. Dan Eggen & John Solomen, FBI Audit Prompts Calls for Reform; Some
Lawmakers Suggest Limits on Patriot Act, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2007, at A1.
95. The eagerness of many in law enforcement to dispense with the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment was revealed in August 2002 by the secret court that
oversees domestic intelligence spying (the “FISA Court”). Making public one
of its opinions for the first time in history, the court revealed that it had
rejected an attempt by the Bush Administration to allow criminal prosecutors
to use intelligence warrants to evade the Fourth Amendment entirely. The
court also noted that agents applying for warrants had regularly filed false and
misleading information. That opinion is now on appeal.
ACLU, Surveillance Under the USA PATRIOT Act (Apr. 3, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/
SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12263&c=206.
96. See Eggen & Solomen, supra note 94. One theory about why President Bush
would sidestep FISA, which has never rejected a warrant application, is that the
information used as the basis of the search was obtained by U.S. operatives torturing
prisoners outside the United States.
97. “Every thing secret degenerates, even the administration of justice; nothing is
safe that does not show how it can bear discussion and publicity.” Lord Acton, letter 74,
(Jan. 23, 1861), in L ORD A CTON AND H IS C IRCLE 165, 166 (Abbot Gasquet ed.,
Longmans, Green & Co. 1906).
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Moreover, a generally recognized principle embedded in our Constitution is
due process—individual rights are not to be violated or overridden without
due process of law.98 Secret courts and search programs that include no
accountability provisions may violate due process.99
E. The Nothing to Hide Argument100
A counterpart to the “just trust us” argument is the nothing to hide
argument. According to this argument, we are to balance the disvalue of
privacy intrusions related to data mining and the like with the security
interests of detecting and preventing terrorist attacks. I suppose we could
weaken this further by merely referencing security interests, which would
include but not be limited to terrorist attacks. A formal version of the
argument might go something like this:
P1. When two fundamental interests conflict, we should adopt a
balancing strategy, determine which interest is more compelling,
and then sacrifice the lesser interest for the greater interest. If it
is generally true that one sort of interest is more fundamental than
another, we are warranted in adopting specific policies that seek
to trade the lesser interest for the greater interest.
P2. In the conflict between privacy and security, it is almost always
the case that security interests outweigh privacy interests. The privacy
intrusions related to data mining or NSA surveillance are not as
weighty as our security interests in stopping terrorism, et cetera—
these sorts of privacy intrusions are more of a nuisance than a
harm.
C3. So it follows that we should sacrifice privacy in these cases and
perhaps adopt policies that allow privacy intrusions for security
reasons.
One could easily attack premise 2—there are numerous harms
associated with allowing surveillance that are conveniently minimized or
forgotten by the “nothing to hide” crowd. The chilling effects on behavior,
data aggregation, exclusion, and secondary use each ratchet up the harms
98. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
99. Secret courts and search programs may also violate “equal protection”
guarantees when specific groups are targeted.
100. For a more rigorous analysis of this argument see Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got
Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745
(2007).
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caused by data monitoring and government surveillance. Daniel J. Solove
notes, “[P]rivacy is threatened not by singular egregious acts, but by a
slow series of relatively minor acts which gradually begin to add up.”101
Solove also points out, as I have already highlighted, that giving
governments too much power undermines the mission of providing for
security—the government itself becomes the threat to security.102 John
Locke put the point nicely: “This is to think that men are so foolish that
they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-Cats
or foxes, but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions.”103
It is also important to note the risk of mischief associated with criminals
and terrorists compared to the kinds of mischief perpetrated by
governments—even our government. In cases where there is a lack of
accountability provisions and independent oversight, governments may
pose the greater security risk.
Consider a slight variation of the “nothing to hide” argument related to
what I have called physical privacy. Suppose there was a way to complete
body cavity searches without harming the target or being more than a
mere nuisance. Perhaps we search the target after he has passed out drunk.
Would anyone find it plausible to maintain a “nothing to hide” view in
this case? I think not. And the reason might be that we are more confident
in upholding these rights and the policies that protect these rights than
we are of almost any cost-benefit analysis related to security. Whether
rights are viewed as strategic rules that guide us to the best
consequences, as Mill would argue, or understood as deontic-based constraints
on consequentialist sorts of reasoning, we are more confident in them
than in almost any “social good” calculation.104 I am not saying that rights
are absolute; they are just presumptively weighty. This line of argument
is an attack on the first premise of the “nothing to hide” position offered
above. In essence, it is the view that rights are resistant to cost-benefit or
consequentialist sorts of arguments. Here we are rejecting the view that
privacy interests are the sorts of things that can be traded for security.
Another worry for the “nothing to hide” argument has to do with justice
and the distribution of harms. Jeremy Waldron writes:
If security-gains for most people are being balanced against liberty-losses for a
few, then we need to pay attention to the few/most dimension of the balance,
not just the liberty/security dimension.

101. Id. at 769.
102. Id. at 766–67; see also supra notes 84–99 and accompanying text.
103. LOCKE, supra note 46, at 53.
104. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 41–63 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ’g
Co. 1979) (1861); J.J.C. Smart, Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism, 6 PHIL. Q. 344,
344–45 (1956). See generally DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM
(1965) (comparing various utilitarian theories).
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....
. . . We are not balancing the rights of the innocent against the rights of the
guilty. We are balancing the interests in life or liberty of the one innocent man
against the security interests of those of the rest of us . . . that will be served if
[criminals] are convicted by the procedures that lead to the wrongful conviction
of the innocent.105

The distribution aspect is highlighted when surveillance policies pick
targets based on appearance, ethnicity, or religion. If the burden of
surveillance policy and the corresponding harms fall on one portion of
society, we may have a problem of justice.
Waldron also notes that balancers who seek to trade privacy for
security typically have little evidence of the overall effect of some
surveillance policy, and whether there might be some other policy that
better protects both privacy and security.106 Consider just for example, almost
any predominately developed “isolationist” country—perhaps Switzerland.
Although admittedly I have not researched this claim, my guess is that
these sorts of countries do not have much terrorist activity and likely do
not have higher crime rates than the United States. The point here is that
one way to obtain more security would be to change our selectively
interventionist policies. In this way security and privacy could be protected.
F. The “Security Trumps” View
According to what might be called the “security trumps” view,107
whenever privacy and security conflict, security wins—that is, security
105. Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. POL. PHIL.
191, 203–04 (2003).
106. Id. at 208–09.
107. Balancing arguments that seek to justify trading privacy for security are
typically based on the assumption that privacy and security are measurable values that
can be compared and traded like diamonds for gold. This view does not need to hold
that we can trade six units of privacy for ten units of security. All we need to be able to
do is justifiably claim that there is some amount of privacy that we would be willing to
trade for some other amount of security.
But it is not at all clear how these trade-offs should work or how these items should be
measured. For example, we may agree that there is no amount of ice cream that we
would trade for our arms and legs. This case is based on Laurence H. Tribe, Policy
Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 90 (1972). See also James
Griffin, Are there Incommensurable Values?, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 44 (1977). Ice cream
may be tasty, but it is not on the same scale as arms and legs. Or suppose we were faced
with the choice of living normally for a year and then dying or having a brain operation
and living in a vegetative state for thirty years. See Griffin, supra, at 47. It is not at all
clear that any amount of “vegetative” existence is worth one year of normal living.
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is more fundamental and valuable than privacy. First, without arguments, it
is not clear why a “security trumps” view should be adopted over a “privacy
trumps” view. Privacy or perhaps self-ownership seems at least as
fundamental or intuitively weighty as security.
Foreshadowing things to come, it is not at all clear—at least in some
cases—that privacy does not enhance security and vice versa. Suppose
that rights afforded their holders specific sorts of powers. For example,
Fred’s privacy rights generate in him a god-like power to completely
control access to his body and to information about him. If we had such
powers, we would also have increased security. Furthermore, if we had
complete security in our bodies and property, including informational
security, we would have secured privacy as well. The tension between
privacy and security arises because these values cannot be protected by
individuals acting alone. Nevertheless, it is important to note that as
these services are contracted out to other agents, like governments, we
grant these parties power over us—power that may undermine security
and privacy.
Continuing with the “security trumps” argument, it would seem odd to
maintain that any increase in security should be preferred to any increase
in privacy or any decrease in privacy is to be preferred to any decrease in
security. Such a view would sanction massive violations of privacy for
mere incremental and perhaps momentary gains in security. Also, given
that others will provide security and power is likely a necessary part of
providing security, we have strong prudential reasons to reject the
“security trumps” view. If those who provide security were saints, then
perhaps there would be little to worry about. The cases already presented
are sufficient to show that we are not dealing with saints.
G. Turning Security Arguments on Their Heads
It is false to claim that in every case more privacy means less security
or that more security entails less privacy. Security arguments actually
James Griffin is not so sure arguing that if dessert consumption was not subject to
diminishing marginal utility (roughly meaning the more you have of something the less
valuable it is), was worth something, and we could contemplate the large numbers
involved, there may be a trade-off point. Id. at 44. In addition, living a long life in a
vegetative state may have no value so the second case has no force—there are no values
to trade-off in this case.
I think that it is clear that most of us would trade privacy for a certain level of
monetary compensation. Suppose someone offered you a cool million dollars to watch
you for a day. Nevertheless, coming up with an ordinal, cardinal, or mere better than/less
than ranking of some amount of privacy compared to some amount of security would be
difficult, especially when such calculations are related to rules or legislation. For a
discussion of incommensurability, see generally INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY,
AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).
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cut the other direction in some cases. For example, it is only through
enhanced privacy protections that we can obtain appropriate levels of
security against industrial espionage, unwarranted invasions into private
domains, and information warfare or terrorism.
An example of how privacy protections enhance security comes from
the debate over encryption standards for electronic communications and
computer networks. Although the NSA’s position is that the widespread
use of encryption software will allow criminals a sanctuary to exchange
information necessary for the completion of illegal activities, consider
how easily this security argument can be turned on its head. National
security for government agencies, companies, and individuals actually
requires strong encryption. Spies have admitted to “tapping in” and
collecting valuable information on U.S. companies—information that
was then used to gain a competitive advantage.108 A report from the
Center for Strategic and International Studies Task Force on Information
Warfare and Security notes, “Cyber terrorists could potentially overload
telephone lines; disrupt air traffic control . . . scramble the software used
by major financial institutions, hospitals, and other emergency services; . . .
or sabotage the New York Stock Exchange.”109 Related to information
war, it would seem that national security requires strong encryption,
multilevel firewalls, and automated detection of attacks.
H. Balancing Privacy, Security, and Accountability
Suppose that there was good evidence that an attack was about to
happen in a private domain. In this case we may be more confident that
security interests outweigh privacy interests and allow the intrusion. To
avoid the travesties already mentioned, we need a set of policies or rules
that adequately protect privacy and security.110
108. JONATHAN WALLACE & MARK MANGAN, SEX, LAWS, AND CYBERSPACE 51 (1997).
109. Christopher Jones, Averting an Electronic Waterloo, WIRED, Dec. 16, 1998,
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1998/12/16875; see also Eric Talbot Jensen,
Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right
of Self-Defense, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 207–08 (2002).
110. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), the court ruled that the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures applied to physical things
like houses, notebooks, and receipts, but not to electronic communications. Thirty-nine
years later the Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), overturned
the Olmstead decision, holding that privacy interests may be found in personal
communications as well as “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” Id. at 353 (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. IV). Olmstead and Katz represent the very issue we are considering—
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With probable cause, a warrant issued from a judge, and “sunlight”
provisions opening up the warrant and the procedure to public scrutiny,
we can be confident that security concerns may be addressed with minimal
impact on individual privacy. The requirement of probable cause puts the
burden of proof in the appropriate place—invasions of private domains
must be justified. The official seeking the warrant would highlight the security
risks involved along with the privacy interests at stake. Judicial oversight
inserts an outside element into the process, providing a check on the
enthusiasm of law enforcement officials. In any event, the question of
when security should override privacy would not be left to the subjective
judgment of one individual or a small group of individuals with
similar interests. Finally, sunlight provisions provide public oversight of
the entire process, including the reasons for the warrant and the judicial
ruling. In this way, public accountability is ensured at each step. Consider
the following table that measures privacy interests across several
dimensions.111
Magnitude of Invasion
Duration, Extent, Means
Slight
A one-time wire-tap of a cell
phone conversation.

Profound
Total surveillance including
data mining, electronic
communications, physical
movements.
Context

Little Expectation
The subject will be monitored
in “public”—perhaps as they
walk down the street.

Reasonable Expectation
The
subject
will
be
monitored at their primary
residence.
Consent

Consented to Surveillance
The subject consents to the
surveillance.

Evaded Surveillance
The subject actively avoids
surveillance.
Public Security

Substantial Security Threat
Credible evidence that lives
are at stake.

Little Security Threat
The pacifist alliance plans to
have a bake sale to raise
funds.

when do security interests justify invasions of private domains. See also Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967).
111. Adapted from the analysis offered by Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy
Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73
N.C. L. REV. 989, 1063–67, 1087–88 (1995).

842

MOORE POST-AUTHOR PAGES VERS.2 (SUPER FINAL).DOC

[VOL. 44: 809, 2007]

2/7/2008 2:54:33 PM

Toward Informational Privacy Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

First, if the subject has consented to the surveillance, then the magnitude,
context, and security dimensions become irrelevant—such monitoring
would be justified. Short of consent, if the magnitude is slight, the context
is clearly “public,” and the security threat high, the burden of proof for
overriding privacy would be low. Sliding to the other extreme, if the
magnitude of the invasion is profound, the context clearly “private,” and
the security threat low, then the burden for overriding privacy would be
high. Finally, if there is a substantial security threat backed by clear and
credible evidence, then independent of the magnitude, context, or consent,
the burden for overriding privacy would be low. For example, if a
police officer has good evidence that a murder will take place tomorrow
afternoon at a suspect’s home, then a warrant would be justified.
In addition, there will be justifiable exceptions to the rule of requiring
probable cause and warrants. There may be instances when law enforcement
officials need to act quickly and do not have the time to secure a warrant
or provide an argument for probable cause—suppose a police officer
hears a scuffle and someone shouts for help. Provided that law enforcement
officers act in “good faith” and can articulate reasonable grounds for entering
private domains after the fact, they should be given some leeway in
these cases. Perhaps internal and civilian oversight committees could
review such cases to determine if appropriate action was pursued. Thus
even in “emergency” situations where privacy is traded for security without
a warrant or judicial oversight, we may insist on sunlight provisions and
accountability.
Security concerns related to mass transportation or large public
gatherings may also justify an exception to the probable cause rule—
individuals may be searched without evidence that they will commit a
crime in these cases. Nevertheless there are at least two important controls
that should be noted. First, individuals in many instances consent to these
sorts of minimal intrusions. If you do not want to have your bag searched,
then stay home and watch the ballgame on television. Note that the more
voluntary the activity, the more robust the consent. Second, in cases where
the activity is less voluntary—flying on an airplane for example—we
insist on stronger justifications for more intrusive searches. Moreover,
judicial and civilian oversight are still appropriate mechanisms for
establishing the correct balance between privacy and security in these
cases. Few would sanction body cavity searches at airports for the minimal
gains in security that could be obtained.
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IV. CONCLUSION
While there is still much work to be done, I think that important steps
have been taken toward informational privacy rights. Privacy—defined
as a control right over access to locations and information—is necessary
for human well-being. Individuals who use and possess their own personal
information do not necessarily worsen others. Moreover, those who capture,
store, and transfer personal information create risks that may worsen
information targets. Finally, a presumptive claim to use and control one’s
own personal information coupled with property rights, body rights, and
a general right to make contracts may serve to protect informational
privacy.
I have also argued that balancing tests that purport to justify invasions
of privacy in the name of security often go awry. “Just trust us,” “nothing
to hide,” and “security trumps” arguments have each been presented and
rejected. It has also been argued that in trading privacy for security we
should insist on establishing probable cause, judicial oversight, and
accountability. Probable cause, in the typical case, sets the standard for
when security interests override privacy rights. Judicial oversight, sensitive
to case-specific facts like the context and magnitude of the proposed
intrusion, introduce an “objective” agent into the process. Sunlight provisions
allow for a public discussion of the merits of specific searches and
seizures. All of this promotes accountability in that the reasons for a search
and the actions of government officials are open to public scrutiny. A
further benefit is that such policies engender trust and confidence in
public officials.
A transparent society is not inevitable. Privacy at the personal level
can be secured through custom and social pressure. Privacy related to
big media, corporations, and the state can be guaranteed by law and
grounded in customs and social practices. On the other hand, transparency
is an important part of good government in the sense that those in power
can be held accountable for their actions. Justice William O. Douglas,
writing for the dissent in Osborn v. United States, noted:
The time may come when no one can be sure whether his words are being
recorded for use at some future time; when everyone will fear that his most
secret thoughts are no longer his own, but belong to the Government; when the
most confidential and intimate conversations are always open to eager, prying
ears. When that time comes, privacy, and with it liberty, will be gone. If a
man’s privacy can be invaded at will, who can say he is free? If his every word
is taken down and evaluated, or if he is afraid every word may be, who can say
he enjoys freedom of speech? If his every association is known and recorded, if
the conversations with his associates are purloined, who can say he enjoys
freedom of association? When such conditions obtain, our citizens will be
afraid to utter any but the safest and most orthodox thoughts; afraid to associate
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with any but the most acceptable people. Freedom as the Constitution envisages it
will have vanished.112

Douglas offers a sobering and frightening prediction of what will
ensue if privacy is not tirelessly and vigorously defended. For the sake
of freedom, autonomy, and human well-being, we should resist becoming a
society of the watchers and the watched.

112.

385 U.S. 323, 353–54 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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